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WAIVER OF FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY:
THE SCOPE OF 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1)

INTRODUCTION

The passage of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 19761
(hereinafter FSIA) marked completion of many years of effort on
the parts of both Congress and the State Department to formulate a
coherent approach to the problem of when to grant a foreign state
or its agencies 2 sovereign immunity from the jurisdiction of United
States courts. 3 Included in the FSIA is a provision for the waiver of
the defense of sovereign immunity by a defendant foreign state:
A foreign state shall not be immune from jurisdiction of
the courts of the United States in any case in which the
foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or

1.

28 US.C. §§ 1330(d), 1391, 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1976).

2.
Hereinafter, the terms foreign state or sovereign will also include the
state's agcncics dnd instrumentalities unless there is a need to refer to them

spCcifically.
3.
The problem was first addressed in the landmark case of the
Schooner E\change v. M'Faddon, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812), where Chief
)uslrce Marshall held ihat foreign sovereigns are immune from the jurisdiction
uf United States courts. Through the years a 'restrictive' theory of sovereign
immunitv gained in favor and was given official recognition in the "Tate Letter"
of May 19, 1952, 26 CE'-r STATE BULL. 984 (1952). See generally von Mehrcn,
The Foreign Sovereicqn Immunities Act of 1976, 17

33 (1978).
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by implication, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the
waiver which the foreign state may purport to effect4
except in accordance with the terms of the waiver.
The purpose of this note is twofold: (1) to examine the principle of waiver as it may apply to situations in which sovereign immunity is pleaded as a defense to the assumption of jurisdiction by a
United States court over a foreign sovereign; and (2) to attempt to
identify those situations, if any, where the principle of waiver can be
extended to obtain in personam jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns
who plead insufficient minimum contacts to support jurisdiction
as defined by International Shoe Co. v. Washington' and its progeny.
Although it would seem that the difference between the principles of foreign sovereign immunity and minimum contacts would
be clear, there appears to be some confusion on the matter. At6
least one leading case in the area, Carey v. National Oil Corp.,
does not differentiate clearly between the two principles, implyin
that, to an extent, they are part and parcel of the same doctrine.
This is not the case. The extent to which the United States chooses
to grant foreign sovereigns immunity from the jurisdiction of its
courts is a matter of political and judicial policy 8 and is subject at
any time to change by Congress or the courts. On the other hand,
minimum contacts, as required in order for a court to assert in
personam jurisdiction over a defendant, are mandated by the constitution and are not similarly subject to legislative change. 9 This is
28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a)(1). It should be noted that the FSIA includes
4.
a second waiver provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (a)(1), which deals with the attachment and execution of property in the United States which is owned by a
foreign sovereign. An analysis of this provision is beyond the scope of this paper
other than to say that §§ 1609-11, which deal with the issue of attachment and
execution of property, severely limit in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction over
property owned by foreign sovereigns. See Reading & Bates Corp. v. National
Iranian Oil Co., 478 F. Supp. 724 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Behring International, Inc.
v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, 475 F. Supp. 396 (D.N.J. 1979).
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
5.
6.
592 F.2d 673 (2d Ci,. 1979).
592 F.2d at 676-77. The court's per curium opinion speaks of
7.
"direct effects" and "minimum contacts" as if they were virtually equivalent
terms. While the case is actually decided on minimum contacts grounds, the
opinion never clearly distinguishes between the two principles.
See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 698-99
8.
(1976).
See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct. 559
9.
(1980); McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Inter-
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a crucial distinction since, in light of the FSIA, it is the constitutional restriction on the courts' jurisdiction i 0 that is likely to provide plaintiffs with the most difficulty.
The first part of this note, then, will attempt to define 'waiver'
as it is used in the FSIA and will emphasize the possible uses of the
principle to defeat the defense of foreign sovereign immunity when
raised in suits arising out of contracts between private domestic
plaintiffs and foreign sovereigns. Contracts will be examined using
a phase/time analysis in which the contractual process is divided into
three separate phases: (I) contract formation; (2) after formation
but prior to termination or breach; (3) after termination or breach.
In each phase there will be an attempt to identify some types of
behavior that reasonably could be construed as a waiver of the
defense of foreign sovereign immunity.
The second part of this note will then try to determine what
types of behavior may amount to waiver of the insufficient minimum
contacts defense to in personam jurisdiction.

I.

THE MEANING OF 'WAIVER'

IN THE CONTEXT

OF THE

FSIA

Perhaps the most important task in attempting to determine the
scope of the doctrine of waiver with regard.to foreign sovereign immunity is that of defining the term itself. To a large extent, the

national Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). While it is true that
International Shoe and McGee were expansive in terms of the traditional standards of in personam jurisdiction, McGee is now the case that generally defines
the limit of a state's power to extend its long-arm jurisdiction and, as such, it

is restrictive.

In referring to International Shoe and its progeny in his dissent

from the clearly restrictive holding in World-Wide Volkswagen, Justice Brennan

said that "the standards enunciated by those cases may already be obsolete as
constitutional boundaries."

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100

S. Ct. 559, 580 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
10. The FSIA is, in essence, a codification of the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity. See note 32 and accompanying text infra. And as justice
White said in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc., v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976), the
purpose of the restrictive theory "is to assure those engaging in commercial
transactions with foreign sovereignties that their rights will be determined in
the courts whenever possible." Id. at 699. Consequently, it is the due process
limitation on in personam jurisdiction rather than the sovereign immunity
limitation that will defeat plaintiffs in commercial suits.
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breadth of the definition will determine the limits of the doctrine.
Professor Corbin has said that there are many definitions of
The Supreme
waiver and that no single one of them is correct.1
Court has described waiver as "an intentional relinquishment of a
known right or privilege." 12 This definition accords well with the
concept of express or explicit waiver as used in the FSIA. Explicit
waiver must amount to an unambiguous declaration on the part of
a foreign sovereign that it will not use the defense of sovereign immunity to avoid any potential legal actions arising from the contract.
As the legislative history of the FSIA points out, this can be done
either by a treaty between the United States and the foreign state
in question or by an express provision of the contract. 13 In addition, the state might make some official pronouncement of its intention to forgo the defense with respect to certain commercial activities in order, for example, to attract bids on a given project or to
facilitate the obtaining of credit.
Explicit waiver yields to definition with relative ease; implicit
waiver is a bit more elusive. The legislative history gives three
situations where implicit waiver could be found (although it does
not imply that the principle is limited to these situations): (1) the
foreign state has agreed to arbitration in another country; (2) the
foreign state has agreed that the law of another country will govern
pleading
the contract; (3) the foreign state has filed a responsive
14
without invoking the defense of sovereign immunity.
The legislative history further states that "a foreign state which
has induced a private person into a contract by promising not to invoke its immunity cannot, when a dispute arises, o back on its
promises and seek to revoke the waiver unilaterally."' 5 The phrase
"induced a person into a contract" demonstrates a Congressional intent to inject an element of estoppel into the principle. Moreover,
courts have interpreted
implicit waiver as being something close to
16
equitable estoppel.
3A CONTRACTS §

752 (1960).

11.

CORB N.

12.

Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,464 (1938).
[19761 U.S. CODE CONG.& AD. NEws 6 6 0 4 .
Id.at 6617.
Id. See Dexter & Carpenter v. Kunglig jarnvagsstyrelsen, 43 F.2d

13.
14.
15.

705 (2nd Cir. 1930). See also Fed R.Civ. P. 12(b), (h); Orange Theatre Corp. v.
Rayherstz Amusement Corp., 139 F.2d 871, 874 (3rd Cir. 1944).
16. 'See Shephard v. Barron, 194 U.S. 553 (1904) where the Court stated:
Provisions of a constitutional nature, intended for the protection of
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In summary, explicit waiver is an express manifestation on
the part of the foreign state that it will not invoke the defense
of sovereign immunity in order to avoid the jurisdiction of United
States courts; implicit waiver is drawn from statements or actions
from which it reasonably can be inferred that the foreign state did"
not intend to invoke the defense. This inference can be strengthened
if inducement is shown.
II.

WAIVER WITHIN THE CONTRACTUAL

A.

Waiver During the Formation of the Contract

RELATIONSHIP

At the Outset of this section, it should be noted that, in a minority of jurisdictions, any waiver except those expressed in a
treaty or contained in the final integrated writing of the contract
may be barred by the parole evidence rule. 1 7 Most jurisdictions,
however, have held that proof of waiver prior to the final formation of a contract will not be barred. 18 The courts so holding have
generally relied on a notion of equitable estoppel. 19 With that
caveat in mind, the following situations are those in which the
courts have found or logically could find waiver of the defense of
sovereign immunity:
1. Explicit Waiver
a. A treaty or other agreement between the United
in which the state agrees
States and the foreign state
20
defense.
the
invoke
to
not
the property owner, may be waived by him, not only by an instrument in writing, upon good consideration, signed by him, but also
by a course of conduct which shows an intention to waive such a
provision, and wherc it would be unjust to others to permit it to be
set up.
Id. at 568.

44647 (2nd ed.

17.

See generally

18.
19.

w. JAEGER. WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS

§ 750 (3rd ed. 1961).

J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS

447 (2nd ed. 1977).

J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS

1977).

20. In Paterson, Zochonis (U.K.) Ltd., v. Compania United Arrow, S.A.,
No. 77 Civ. 4470 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 1980), plaintiff maintained that when defendant, a corporation owned by the People's Republic of China, signed an
"Application for Certificate of Financial Responsibility" with the United States
government and appointed an agent for service of process in the United States,
the corporation had waived sovereign immunity. The Court held that the "Appli-
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An express clause in the final integrated writing of
not to inthe contract in which the state promises
21
voke the defense of sovereign immunity.
c.
A general promise by the state that it will not invoke
the defense in specified commercial situations.
Implicit Waiver
a. An agreement22 to arbitrate any disputes arising out of
the contract.
will be governed by
b. An agreement that the contract
23
the law of a particular country.
c.
An agreement regarding the payment of legal fees or
other expenses arising from legal disputes relating to
the contract.
d.
The totality of actions of a state's agency if the
agency generally acts as if it were any private com24
mercial enterprise participating in the marketplace.
Various acts indicative of this might be:
i. the agency being organized or incorporated as
if it were a private venture;
ii. the agency claiming it is independent of a direct
government control;
b.

2.

iii.

the government in question disavowing direct

control over the agency;
iv. the directors of the agency being otherwise not
cation" did not have the breadth of a treaty or similar agreement but was for the
very narrow purpose of insuring compliance with federal water pollution standards so that the corporation's ships would be allowed to pass through the

Panama Canal. This, the court said, would not support waiver of sovereign immunity for all actions brought against the corporation in the United States.
21. See note 16, supra.
22. See Ipitrade Int'l v. Nigeria. (D.D.C. 1978). The Ipitrade contract
contained an arbitration clause and the court held that that brought the case
squarely within the ambit of the FSIA waiver provision.
23. Id. The contract in Ipitrade also contained a provision agreeing that
the laws of Switzerland would govern the contract. This too brought the action
under the FSIA's waiver provision.
24. See Trendex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 119771 1
Lord Denning, M.R., found that although the bank was an
All E.R. 881.
agency of Nigeria and, in general, behaved as a governmental bank rather than a
private one, it had acted as a private concern in the world market and this was
sufficient to take the bank from under the umbrella of sovereign immunity.

19801

WAIVER OF FOREIGN SOVEREIGN

IMMUNITY

connected with the government;
soliciting
v. the agency advertising or otherwise
25
business as would a private concern.
e. An extra-contractual indication on the part of the
foreign state of its good-faith ;ntention to perform its
part of a bargain or suffer the consequences of nonmight be the posting of a
performance. An example
26
performance bond.
A showing by the plaintiff that the state had not inf.
voked the defense of sovereign immunity on past occations when sued in foreign courts in actions arising
from commercial agreements. (In this instance, the
plaintiff would probably have to plead knowledge
and reliance.)
These are merely possible examples of implicit waiver. There
are doubtless many others. Basically, these acts amount to a holding
out by the state of its intent to behave as if it were a private concern
operating in the world marketplace. Presumably, the state indicates
such an intent in order to induce private business to enter into commercial contracts where, absent a belief in the state's good faith, they
would not enter into such agreements. It is this-general premise that
supports the implied waiver of sovereign immunity.
B.

Waiver after Formation and prior to Termination or Breach
1.

Explicit Waiver
During this phase of the contractual relationship, any of

25. This type of behavior was held not to constitute waiver of the defense of foreign sovereign immunity in Harris v. Vao Intourist, Moscow, 487 F.
Supp. 1056 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), when defendant, an agent of the Soviet government, was clearly behaving as a commercial travel agency in the United
States. However, the action was one for wrongful death and the site of the alleged tort was in the Soviet Union. The entire tenor of the opinion was that requiring a foreign sovereign to defend a wrongful death action resulting from a
hotel fire in the Soviet Union in a United States court might be stretching longarm iurisdiction a bit too far. It remains to be seen how the courts would construe waiver in a contract action involving a similar "commercial" defendant.
26. See Trendex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 119771 1
All E.R. 881. The Nigerian bank had posted a bond and, further, had indicated
in a letter that the bond was their guarantee of good faith. While the court did
not deal with the issue of waiver, in essence, Lord Denning found that these acts
constituted a waiver.

N.Y.J.
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the examples of explicit waiver listed in part 'A' would apply. In essence, the state can explicitly waive the defense
of sovereign immunity at any time.
Implicit Waiver
In general, the possibilities for implicit waiver during this
phase of the contractual relationship are far more limited
than in the formation phase. The reason for this is
obvious: the plaintiff has already entered into the contract and it is now extremely difficult to show inducement. The principle is now limited to the narrow definition of waiver, where it is held to be merely an intentional
relinquishment of a known right. A possible exception is
the situation in which the plaintiff could show inducement
to continue performance in the face of an anticipatory
breach. In such an instance, the acts that would imply
waiver in the formation phase would be applicable here.
Otherwise, acts that might imply waiver in this phase
would be agreements to arbitrate disputes arising in the
performance phase when such agreements were not in the
original integrated writing. 27 Also, an acceptance by the
state of a construction based on the laws of another country put on part or all of the contract might imply waiver.

Waiver Subsequent to Breach or Termination
1.

Explicit Waiver
As a practical matter, it is unlikely that a foreign state intending to plead sovereign immunity would explicitly
waive the defense in this phase. If, for whatever reason,
the state chose not to plead the defense, it would merely
fail to enter the plea.

27. The court so found in Libyan American Oil Co. v. Socialist People's
Libyan Arab Jamahirya, Misc. No. 79-57 (D.D.C. Jan. 18, 1980). Libya agreed
to modify an arbitration clause in a contract with the Libyan American Oil
Co. (LIAMCO) more than ten years after the original contract was signed. The
original clause called for arbitration only in Libya. The Libyan government later
agreed to a clause that provided for arbitration at a place upon which either the
parties or the arbitrators agreed. The court said that "[allthough the United
States was not named, consent to have a dispute arbitrated where the arbitrators
might determine was certainly consent to have it arbitrated in the United States.
Libya thus waived its defense of sovereign immunity ....... Id.
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Implicit Waiver
a. A failure to enter a timely plea of sovereign immunity
(i.e., entering a28responsive plea on the merits) is an
implied waiver.
b. The state availing itself of United States courts as a
is
plaintiff is, insofar as the specific transaction
29
immunity.
sovereign
of
waiver
a
concerned,
c. The courts might take cognizance of how courts of
the foreign state in question deal with the matter in
the reverse situation. If they would not allow the
plea of sovereign immunity in similar circumstances,
it would be a strong indication of that state's intenwaive the defense in the courts of other
tion to
30
states.
In terms of the phase/time analysis, it is clear that waiver is
most likely to occur in the initial phase, i.e., prior to the formation
of the final integrated writing of the contract. This is true especially
in the instance of explicit waiver, if for no other reason than that the
foreign state is unlikely to see any advantage in granting an explicit
waiver after that phase. Implicit waiver is also most likely to occur
in the formation phase of the contract since this type of waiver often
is similar to estoppel in that it implies inducement and, as has been
noted, inducement can occur after the formation of a contract.
Realistically, however, the courts are going to find it far less often
than in the pre-formation phase.
Obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign in a United
States court actually presents a plaintiff with two distinct problems:
the plaintiff must show that the sovereign is not entitled to immunity from suit; and he must show that there are sufficient minimum contacts to support the court's assumption of in personam
jurisdiction over the sovereign defendant without violating due
process. While waiver, as set out in the phase/time analysis of a contract, seems theoretically valid as a potential means of defeating the
defense of sovereign immunity, as a practical matter it will probably
be of limited utility. It could, however, be a useful tool in defeating
the "inadequate minimum contacts" defense.
The main reason that waiver is unlikely to become an important
2.

28. See note 15 and accompanying text, supra.
29. See National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955).
30. Id. justice Frankfurter regarded this as an important point in the
disposition of the National City Bank case.
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means of defeating the defense of sovereign immunity is that the
FSIA contains other provisions better suited for the purpose. Of
these, the provision of most importance to contractual actions states:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction
of courts of the United States or of the states in any casein which the action is based upon a commercial activity
carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or
upon an act performed in the United States in connection
with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere;
or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United
31
States.
This provision appears to provide a broad restriction to the defense of sovereign immunity-so broad that it is the conclusion of
this note that sovereign immunity is no longer a meaningful defense
to the assumption of jurisdiction by United States courts over
actions arising out of commercial activities. The only rein on the
$commercial activity' provision of the FSIA is the interpretation of
the term 'direct effect' by the courts. If the courts interpret the
term narrowly, the exceptions to sovereign immunity in commercial
contexts will be limited. On the other hand, if the courts are willing
to view direct effects as akin to substantial and foreseeable economic
impact, then the restrictions on sovereign immunity will be virtually
all-inclusive in the commercial arena.
It is difficult to see what the principle of waiver can actually
add to this. Theoretically, of course, a court might find waiver
where it would not find direct effects, but in realistic terms it is unlikely that a court construing direct effects narrowly would construe
waiver, a more questionable doctrine, broadly. Further, it doesn't
appear that the courts should resort to waiver in order to defeat
claims of sovereign immunity in suits arising out of commercial activities. It is clear from the legislative history of the FSIA that
to make the 'restrictive'
Congress's intent when passing the act was
32
controlling.
immunity
sovereign
of
theory
Further, the Supreme Court has indicated that it, too, embraces
the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, stating unequivocally in
31.
32.

28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976).
[19761 U.S. CODE CONG. & D.

News

6604, 6613.
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Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba 33 that neither a claim of
sovereign immunity nor an act of state will be accepted by United
34
States courts when the state is acting as a commercial entity.
To reiterate, given such clear statements on the part of both
Congress and the Court to the effect that a state acting as a commercial entity cannot successfully invoke the defense of sovereign
immunity, it is difficult to see what the waiver provision of the FSIA
adds. Unless the provision is regarded as applying only to noncommercial situations (an unlikely reading), it must imply something
more. It is reasonable to conclude that the principle of waiver might
be used effectively to defeat defenses of insufficient minimum contacts to support in personam jurisdiction.
III.

WAIVER

OF

THE

DEFENSE

OF

INSUFFICIENT

MINIMUM

CONTACTS

It is clear that in the wake of the FSIA, plaintiffs' real barrier to
obtaining jurisdiction over foreign sovereign defendants is not that of
sovereign immunity, but rather is a matter of showing sufficient
minimum contacts to support the in personam jurisdiction of the
courts. The Carey v. National Oil Corp. 35 decision is a case in point:
although the opinion discusses the FSIA extensively, the rationale of
the holding is squarely based on insufficient minimum contacts. It
seems clear that the case would have been decided the same way if
the defendant had not bothered to plead sovereign immunity and
had relied solely on the defense of insufficient minimum contacts.
As mentioned earlier, in contrast to the principle of foreign
sovereign immunity, the requirement of adequate minimum contacts
with the forum state is constitutional doctrine. 36 As the court held
in Hanson v. Denckla, 37 "a defendant may not be called upon [to
defend in the courts of a particular state] . . . unless he has had the

33. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
34. Id. at 695, 705. The Court found that the policy of avoiding embarrassment to the Executive Branch in the conduct of foreign relations was no
longer controlling in situations where the foreign state was acting as a commercial
entity. Id. at 697-98.
35. 592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1979).
36. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. International
Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
37. 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).
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'minimal contacts' with that State that are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over him."
Itis important to bear in mind, however, that there are two
fundamental rationales that underlie the principle of minimum contacts-rationales that are often not applicable to a situation in which
a domestic plaintiff is attempting to sue a foreign defendant and
that make a mechanical application of the principle to such situations inappropriate. The first rationale is that minimum contacts
are mandated by federalism. As the Hanson court said, "[minimum
contactsi are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of
the respective States." 38 The second rationale grows, to an extent,
out of the first: in essence, it is presumed that a plaintiff in the
United States can always get in personam jurisdiction over a United
States defendant in at least one state. The state in which the plaintiff can get jurisdiction may not be to his liking, and it might materially affect the outcome of the case, but at least he is guaranteed a
forum. 39 This is obviously not the case in the situation in which
the defendant is a foreign sovereign since it is most probable that if
the state is trying to invoke sovereign immunity here, it is going to
grant itself sovereign immunity in its own courts. Therefore, if a
United States plaintiff is denied a domestic forum, he is effectively
precluded from adjudicating his claim. As the Tate Letter said, "the
Department [of State I feels that the widespread and increasing practice on the part of governments of engaging in commercial activities
makes necessary a practice which will enable persons doing business
with them to have their rights determined in the courts. 40 This policy

38. Id. In fact, it seems clear that if federalism were not a primary consideration in the United States, the 'minimum contacts' doctrine would not
exist. Absent the federal system, the United States district courts would be the
only courts of original jurisdiction and what are now minimum contacts problems would merely be matters of forum non conveniens. Persuasive arguments
have been made that minimum contacts need not be a consideration in any
Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d
actions before federal courts. See Jaftex Corp. v.1
508 (2nd Cir. 1960). While laftex was overruled, many feel that the laftex
position was the correct one and believe that if the Supreme Court ever decides
the issue squarely, they may agree.
39. The cases in the area, such as McGee, Hanson and International
Shoe, discuss notions of "fundamental fairness"- and the inequities of making a
defendant defend an action in a forum with which he has no minimum
contacts. There's never a sense that defendant won't be obligated to defend
anywhere.
40. 26 DEPe' STATE BULL. 985 (1952).
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must be accorded even greater weight today than in 1952.
As a consequence, a blind invocation of the minimum contacts
requirement in the case of foreign defendants, as occurred in the
Carey decision, is ill-supported by the principles underpinning the
doctrine and is inequitable in any practical assessment of the realities
of contemporary world order. A way to ameliorate the bad effects
of the minimum contacts requirements might be to broaden the application and effect of the principle of waiver.
The Supreme Court has held that constitutional rights can be
waived. 41 In particular, it has held that in certain commercial situations, the states can waive their constitutional right to sovereign immunity as guaranteed by the eleventh amendment. 4 2 There are
several ways in which the minimum contacts requirement could be
waived by a foreign defendant: it could expressly waive its in
personam defenses either by treaty or by an express condition in
a contract that any legal actions arising from the contract will be
adjudicated in a United States court. And, of course, it could
implicitly waive the defense by not pleading it in a timely fashion.
Realistically, however, we are not concerned with situations
in which waiver is so readily apparent. Rather, we are co ncerned
with situations where the foreign sovereign has structured its contractual relationships in such a way as to avoid having the requisite
minimum contacts with any of the state jurisdictions in the United
States. The lengths to which the courts might be willing to go in
accepting any of the acts connoting waiver listed earlier in this note
are, of course, a matter of conjecture. However, it does seem that
the courts could reasonably and justifiably find waiver of the minimum contacts requirement in those situations where the plaintiff
can show that the foreign state acted in such a manner as to indicate
that the state intended to submit to adjudication any disputes
arising from the commercial agreement and the state now refuses
to honor such an implied commitment. The courts of this country
could fairly find that by such a refusal to defend the action elsewhere, the state has waived its right to not have to defend the
action in the United States. Such a finding seems to be equitable
41. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1948); Shepard v. Barron, 194
U.S. 553 (1952).
42. Parden v. Terminal Ry. Co., 377 U.S. 184 (1964), held that a state,
by organizing a state-owned railroad as a common carrier after Congress had
passed laws regulating common carriers, had effectively waived its sovereign
immunity from suit with regard to that railroad.

172

N.Y.J.

INT'L

&

COMP.

L.

IVol.

I

and not in violation of the spirit or the underlying rationale
of the "minimum contacts" doctrine.

CONCLUSION

The principle of waiver has broad possible application to the
defense of foreign sovereign immunity.
However, in the entire
context of the FSIA, other provisions of the act seem more immediately and obviously applicable.
Nonetheless, if the courts
were willing to construe the principle of waiver broadly, it could
be an important tool in establishing in personam jurisdiction over
foreign sovereigns that rely on the lack of sufficient minimum
contacts in order to defeat the jurisdiction of the United States
courts.
Henry T. Berry

